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The federal Constitution creates very significant individual
rights, but is conspicuously quite silent on the question of specific
remedies to enforce those rights. And yet, individual constitutional
rights work like any other rights; these rights are not meaningful
unless they have enforcement mechanisms. Congress understood
this early on. Back in 1871, just three years after the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress enacted what is now 42
U.S.C. Section 1983. 3 Section 1983 is the vehicle that authorizes
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2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of the law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute ... of any
State... subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen.., to
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individuals to assert their constitutional rights claims against state
and local government.
Today we see a very wide range of constitutional claims
asserted under Section 1983. The most common of these claims
are: large numbers of Fourth Amendment 4 claims challenging
arrests, searches, the use of force by law enforcement officers; and
continuously increasing numbers of First Amendment retaliation
claims, mainly by public employees, property owners and
prisoners. In addition, there are a large number of procedural due
process claims, substantive due process claims, and equal
protection claims. Just about any possible constitutional claim
may be the subject of a Section 1983 action.
TAKINGS CLAUSE
During the last twenty or maybe twenty-five years, we have
seen an ongoing increase in the number of takings claims asserted
in federal court under Section 1983. 5 These claims used to be filed
the deprivations of any' rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
5 See, e.g.,Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002) (holding that a governmental moratorium on property
development does not constitute a "per se taking"); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (holding that the mere fact that the land use
restrictions predated acquisition of property did not preclude owner from
asserting regulatory takings claim); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (finding that when an owner of real property must
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of common good he has
suffered a taking); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (holding that a temporary taking requires just
compensation); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138
(1978) (holding that the government regulation had not effected a taking of
appellant's property; the restrictions imposed were substantially related to the
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routinely in state courts. A strong motivator for litigating these
claims under Section 1983 is the potential for the recovery of
attorneys fees under Section 1988,6 the fee shifting statute that is
attached to Section 1983.
Landowners seeking to assert takings claims have to satisfy
fairly stringent ripeness requirements. They have to show they
obtained a final decision on the use of the property from the local
authorities, and that they have sought just compensation through
the state judiciary. 7  If the landowners satisfy these ripeness
requirements, they can assert, under Section 1983, that the action
of state government, or more likely the action of local government,
has resulted in the taking of property requiring the government to
pay the landowners just compensation.8There are two types of governmental actions that are
considered to be categorical or automatic takings of property. One
is a physical appropriation or physical invasion of property by the
government.9 For instance, if the government decides to pave a
highway over your backyard, that would be an automatic taking of
property requiring just compensation. With respect to government
regulation, if a court was to come to the conclusion that a
governmental regulation deprived the property owner of all
promotion of the general welfare and allowed for reasonable beneficial use of
the property).6 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000) states in pertinent part:
(b) Attorney's fees. In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1977, 1977A, 1978, 1979, 1980, and
1981 of the Revised Statutes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983... the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs.....
7 Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 195 (1985) (concluding that respondent's claim was not ripe because
respondent did not obtain a final decision for the application of zoning ordinance
and subdivision regulations to the property, nor used state procedures for
obtaining just compensation).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "private property" shall
not "be taken for public use without just compensation."
9 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
430 (1982) (determining that New York's law requiring landlords to allow
television cable companies to place cable facilities on the outside of their
apartment buildings constituted a taking even though the facilities occupied at
most only one and one half cubic feet of landlord's property).
2002
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economic value of the property, or all economic viable use of the
property, that too would be considered an automatic or categorical
taking requiring just compensation.' 0
But for other types of government regulation, whether the
regulation constitutes a taking of property is determined on a case-
by-case basis. The decisional law on this issue is vast. I am not
going to make any effort to try to review that, but essentially this
all occurs on a case-by-case basis requiring courts to balance the
interference with the property owner's "reasonable investment
backed expectations"" against the strength of the governmental
interest. 2 This, of course, is the big bucks issue of constitutional
law. If the court comes to the conclusion that all the government
has done is regulate the prolerty, the government does not have to
provide just compensation. However, if the court reaches the
conclusion that the government regulation constitutes a taking of
property, then the government has to provide just compensation.1 4
This is a very sticky issue for the courts.
Even going back to the early decision law, all the Court
was able to say was things like: "this is a question of degree"; "has
the government gone too far?" 15 Not very helpful. But it describes
10 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (holding that when a state seeks to sustain a
regulation that deprives the landowner of all economically beneficial use of his
property, this is a "taking").
" See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 127 (finding that a state statute
that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct
investment backed expectations as to amount to a "taking").
12 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (examining the
"taking" question by engaging in factual inquiries that have identified several
factors such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment backed expectations and the character of the
governmental action).
13 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (explaining that a government
regulation by definition involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and
that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation
of private property, to require compensation in all such circumstances would
effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase).
14 See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175 (determining that in the interest of
"justice and fairness" an economic injury caused by government action must be
duly compensated by the government to the landowner).
15 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)
(We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
[Vol 19
SECTION 1983 DECISIONS
what the law is trying to figure out: Is this mere government
regulation? And, if it is mere regulation, then all property owners
will absorb the cost of the interference with their property for the
greater social good. 16 But, if the state or municipality goes too far,
then it is not fair to impose the cost on the individual property
owner and the government should provide just compensation.
All of this is background to the Supreme Court's major
takings decision of last term, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 18 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, the Supreme Court held that a thirty-two month
moratorium imposed by the government on land use development
did not constitute a per se or categorical taking of the property
owner's property. The dominant rationale of the majority opinion
was that this was not a total deprivation of the economic value of
the property because when the moratorium is lifted, the value of
the property will be revived. 19
This decision received a lot of attention from the media. It
was widely viewed as a setback for property owners and a major
victory for land use planners and environmentalists. But, I think
the view that this was a major defeat for property owners, who had,
in a series of recent Supreme Court decisions won some major
victories, is somewhat overstated. All the Court held in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council was that the moratorium did not
constitute a categorical or automatic taking of property. 20 The
Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether the
moratorium might constitute a taking of property when applying
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change. As we already have said, this is
a question of degree -- and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions. But we regard this as going beyond any
of the cases decided by this Court.)
16 See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 202 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that in
most litigation involving a challenge to a governmental regulation, the
government contends that the public interest justifies the harm to the property
owner and that no compensation need be paid).
17 id.
18 535 U.S. 302 (2002),
'9 Id. at 351.20 Id. at 354.
2002
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the balancing approach.2' In fact, Justice Stevens, writing for the
court, used tentative language at the very end of the opinion,
stating, "it may well be true that a moratorium that lasts for more
than one year should be viewed by the courts with special
skepticism. 22 So, there is ammunition here for landowners to use
in future litigation when they try to argue that the moratorium
does, in fact, constitute a taking of property.
JUDICIAL ACCESS
There are a fairly sizable number of Section 1983 decisions
in which plaintiffs asserted a denial of their constitutional right of
access to the courts.23  Sometimes these claims are of a systemic
nature, for example where plaintiffs seek to challenge a fee
requirement that is imposed as a precondition to commencing a
lawsuit in state or federal court and the plaintiff cannot afford to
pay it.24 In Christopher v. Harbury, the Court stated the "object of
21 Id. at 317; see also Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175 (identifying several
factors such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of the
governmental action as factors which must be weighed in the determination of
whether a "taking" has occurred).
22 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341.23 See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002) (holding that no claim
for denial of "access to the courts" was stated since the plaintiff failed to
identify the underlying cause of action of intentional infliction of emotional
distress); see, e.g., Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that an attempt to cover up police wrongdoing, hiding the facts from
the plaintiffs which ultimately neither prevented the plaintiffs from pursuing
relief nor reduced the value of their claim, was not actionable under § 1983).
24 See, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102, 106 (1996) (holding that a denial
of appeal cannot be based on plaintiffs ability to pay a record fee in parental-
rights termination action); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372 (1971)
(holding that the requirement of a divorce filing fee as applied to indigent who
could not afford to pay the fee violated procedural due process); Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713 (1961) (finding that the State's refusal to docket an
indigent prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus without the payment of a
statutory filing fee denies the prisoner the equal protection of the laws);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that the government
cannot require indigents to pay a fee for a direct appeal in a criminal case);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (holding that a transcript fee for
appellate review in a criminal case was unconstitutional as applied to indigents
who could not afford to pay the fee).
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the denial of access suit is to place the plaintiff in a position to
pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition has
been removed.,
25
There is also a second type of claim, a sub-category of
access to the courts claims. There has been somewhat of a
proliferation of these second type of judicial access claims in
recent years in which the plaintiff alleges that official acts impeded
litigation of a claim for relief.2 6 For instance, as a result of alleged
misconduct by the government, the federal court plaintiff, asserting
a violation of her constitutional right of judicial access, alleges that
she has been deprived of the ability to assert a particular cause of
action. Or, this is a little variation: a plaintiff may allege that she
has been deprived of the ability to litigate a particular cause of
action fully, again, as a result of government suppression of
information or deceit.
27
Last term, the Supreme Court decided Christopher v.
Harbury28 which addressed this issue. It was actually a Bivens
29
case, not a Section 1983 case, but it was the type of claim that
could be asserted under Section 1983. In Christopher, the Court
held that when a plaintiff asserts a denial of his constitutional right
to judicial access, the plaintiff must, in the federal court complaint,
25 Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413.
26 Id. at 414.
27 See, e.g., Swekel v. River Rouge 119 F.3d 1259, 1261 (6th Cir. 1997)
(reasoning that because the police cover-up extended throughout the
investigation, the plaintiff lost the opportunity to sue under the statute of
limitations); Foster v. Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding
that although plaintiffs claim that material information had been withheld
during discovery, leading them to settle for less was valid, defendants were
immune from suit because plaintiffs failed to clearly establish that the right to
judicial access included plaintiffs' claimed right to be free of discovery abuses);
Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The cover-up and
resistance of the investigating police officers rendered hollow [the plaintiffs]
ri~ht to seek redress.").
536 U.S. 403 (2002).
29 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). Black's Law Dictionary defines a Bivens case as a name for a
type of action for damages to vindicate constitutional right when federal
government official has violated such right. Action is available if no equally
effective remedy is available, no explicit congressional declaration precludes
recovery, and no "special factors counsel hesitation". BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990).
2002
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assert that the government's alleged suppression of information or
misrepresentation of fact in some way impeded plaintiff from
asserting his particular cause of action.
30
I do not think that is the difficult part of the Court's
decision. I think the difficult part is the requirement that the
federal court plaintiff also allege the underlying cause of action.
3 1
In addition, the plaintiff has to assert his underlying cause of action
in the same way and with the same pleading requirements as if that
was the claim that was being asserted in the first place. 32  The
plaintiffs complaint must also "identify a remedy that may be
awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit
that may yet be brought.,
33
I smell a rat here. And the rat I think I smell is the "catch
22" rat. The very nature of the plaintiff's judicial access claim is: I
am suing the government for denial of judicial access because the
government was deceitful and I have no evidence to support my
underlying cause of action and, therefore, I could not assert it.
And now, the Supreme Court says that in order to bring a claim for
denial of judicial access, the plaintiff must plead the underlying
cause of action as well.34 If the plaintiff could have properly
asserted his underlying cause of action, he might not be in court
now claiming a denial of judicial access. This is the "catch 22."
So, I think Christopher is mainly a pleading requirements case that
creates a serious problem for plaintiffs that seek to litigate these
claims.
30 Christopher, 536 U.S. 403 at 415-16.
31 Id. at 420-21 (holding that petitioner had no claim for denial of "access to
the courts" because she failed to identify the underlying cause of action of
intentional infliction of emotional distress in her complaint).
32 Id. at 416 (finding that "like any other element of an access claim, the
underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations
in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.").
33 Id. at 415 (explaining that when the access claim, like the case at bar, looks
backward, the complaint must identify a remedy that may be awarded as




EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT OF THE PRISONER LITIGATION
REFORM ACT
Prisoners seek to make great use of Section 1983. Unlike
other Section 1983 plaintiffs who are excused from the
requirement of exhausting administrative remedies, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act35  (PLRA) requires that prisoners
challenging the conditions of their confinement must first exhaust
available administrative revenues. Two terms ago, the United
States Supreme Court held in Booth v. Churner,36 that the
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement applies even
when the plaintiff is seeking judicial relief, such as damages, that
is not available administratively. 37 The Booth decision gave the
PLRA an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement a
broad interpretation. Last term in Porter v. Nussle,38 the Supreme
Court held that prisoners who assert excessive force claims against
prison guards are first required to exhaust their administrative
remedies. 39 In other words, a claim of excessive force by prisoners
is considered a challenge to a condition of confinement in which
the prisoners find themselves.40  Porter extends the broad
interpretation of the PLRA exhaustion requirement given in Booth.
Porter was a very unsurprising decision.
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2000) provides in pertinent part:
no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States... or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted;
see also, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733-34 (2001).
36 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
7Id. at 736.
3 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002) (holding that "no action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until
such administrative remedies as are available-are exhausted.").
39 id.




In contrast, I think the second prisoner case, Hope v.
Pelzer,4 1 was a surprising and important decision. The prisoner's
name was Larry Hope and maybe that was the "x-factor"; maybe
his last name was the magic for this Alabama prisoner.42 Larry
Hope alleged that while he was on work detail, a polite phrase for
the chain gang in Alabama, he was cuffed to a hitching post two
times to sanction him for his "disruptive conduct".43 He had taken
a nap during a morning bus ride to the chain gang's work site and
had failed to get off the bus quickly enough. As a result, he was
cuffed to a hitching post for a period of seven-hours in the hot
Alabama sun, without a shirt, which caused his skin to burn, and
was given only one or two water breaks. He was not allowed to
have access to bathroom facilities and was taunted by the prison
guards about his thirst.44 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circhit
had applied the doctrine of qualified immunity properly to the facts
of this case.45 The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals in holding that this type of treatment constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, violative of the Eighth Amendment.46 Most
significantly, however, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
circuit court's analysis of qualified immunity. The Supreme Court
held that the Eleventh Circuit, which found that the prison guards
were protected by qualified immunity, misapplied the qualified
immunity doctrine and reversed the circuit court's determination
that qualified immunity protected the prison officials from
liability.
47
4 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
42 Id. at 733.
43 Id. ("In 1995, Alabama was the only state that followed the practice of
chaining inmates to one another in work squads. It is also the only state that
handcuffed prisoners to 'hitching posts' if they refused to work or otherwise
disrupted work squads.").
44 Id. at 734-35.
4 1 Id. at 733.
46 Hope, 536 U.S. at 737; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides in pertinent part:
"excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."471 Id. at 739.
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So, here is a civil rights case in which the prisoner was
successful in the United States Supreme Court. Think about what I
just said because it is the rare case indeed in which a prisoner
prevails in a civil rights suit in the U.S. Supreme Court. So, this is
a rare decision, a modem miracle.
In my opinion, qualified immunity is the most important
issue in Section 1983 civil rights actions. In Section 1983 actions,
a high percentage of Section 1983 cases are resolved on the basis
of qualified immunity, and often resolved in favor of the
defendant.48 The key inquiry on qualified immunity is did the
defendant official violate clearly established constitutional law?
49
If the official acted in an unconstitutional manner, but the law on
the constitutional claim was not clearly established when the
official acted, the official is said to have acted in an objectively
reasonable manner and qualified immunity protects the official
from personal liability.50  However, if the official acted in an
unconstitutional manner and if, at the time the official acted, the
constitutional law was clearly established the official should have
known that what she did was unconstitutional. Under those
circumstances, qualified immunity does not protect the official
from personal monetary liability. The courts, however, have often
had difficulty trying to figure out whether the constitutional law
was clearly established rat the time the official acted. Sometimes
we have circuit court opinions where two judges say the law was
clearly established, and the other judge says it was not clearly
48 See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The Supreme Court
reasoned that the initial inquiry should have been whether the facts alleged
showed the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. The next question
should have been whether the right was clearly established in the context of the
case. The Court found that the duty to protect the safety and security of the Vice
President did not have clearly established rules prohibiting the officer from
acting as he did. Id. See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987)
(finding that petitioner was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds if he could have established, as a matter of law, that a reasonable officer
could have believed his search was lawful); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
536 (1985) (finding petitioner immune from suit for his authorization of the
wiretap under the qualified immunity exception.).
49 See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639; Mitchell, 472
U.S. at 517.50 See e.g., Saucier,533 U.S. at 201; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639; Mitchell,
2002
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established. Or, the district court says it was clearly established
and the circuit court says it was not.
The Hope decision is a very significant case because the
Eleventh Circuit's prior position on qualified immunity was so
overly protective of officials sued under Section 1983 that the
doctrine came close to being a form of absolute immunity for the
officials. 51 The Eleventh Circuit's position was that for the
constitutional law to be clearly established, the prior precedent had
to be on "all fours" with the facts of the instant case. The Court of
Appeals said to show that the law was clearly established "the
federal law by which the government officials conduct should be
[judged must be] .. .pre-existing, obvious and mandatory and
established not by abstractions but by cases that are materially
similar to the precedents that the plaintiff is relying upon., 52
The Supreme Court in Hope said that the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation of qualified immunity was too rigid and was not
what the Supreme Court intended.53 I think we now have
somewhat of a change in the application of the qualified immunity
doctrine. The Supreme Court in Hope said the key inquiry under
qualified immunity is whether, at the time the official acted, the
official had fair warning, fair notice, that the official conduct was
unconstitutional.54 I think a fair warning or a fair notice inquiry
472 U.S. at 517.
51 See, e.g. Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (1 1th Cir. 2001), rev'd by, 536
U.S. 730 (2002) (stating that "when analyzing a qualified immunity defense,
[the court looks] to 'whether a reasonable official could have believed his or her
conduct to be lawful in light of clearly established law') (citing Swint v. City of
Wadley, 51 F.3d 988, 995 (11 th Cir. 1995)).
12 Id. at 981.
" 536 U.S. at 739. The Court found that the Eleventh Circuit's analysis,
which required that the facts of previous cases be "'materially similar' to Hope's
situation" in order to give officers notice that conduct violates a constitutional
right, was too rigid. Rather, the Court held:
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours
"must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates right. This is not to
say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previsouly been held
unlawful... but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law
the unlawfulnmess must be apparent."
Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
14 Id. at 739-40.
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will be the focus of the next wave of qualified immunity cases
before the courts.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hope takes a broad,
flexible approach to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court
determined that the prison officials had notice that their conduct
was unconstitutional based on (1) circuit court precedent, though
not directly on point, (2) the fact prison officials in Alabama were
violating part of a stife reputation concerning the hitching post, and
(3) a report submitted by the United States Department of Justice
to the Alabama Department of Corrections55 finding that use of
the hitching post by Alabama prison officials violated prisoner's
rights in significant respects. The Supreme Court in Hope took this
report into account, 56 even though there was no evidence that this
report had ever been communicated to the defendant prison
officials.57 I am not sure that I understand this rationale, but it is
definitely good for plaintiff's lawyers.
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL STATUTES UNDER SECTION 1983
Constitutional rights are not the only rights that are
enforceable under Section 1983. In some instances, federal
statutes may be enforceable under Section 1983 as well.58 When a
lecturer or law professor says that "in some instances" the next
question becomes: "well, tell us which ones", right? The answer
is, it depends on congressional intent; what did Congress intend
with respect to that particular federal statute? Did Congress intend
that the federal statute be enforced under Section 1983? This is a
tough issue because Congress has rarely actually articulated its
intent as to whether a particular federal statute would be
enforceable under Section 1983 or not.59 So, in these cases, we are
" Id. at 741-42.
56 Id.
"7 Hope, 536 U.S. at 759 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
58 See, e.g., Wilder v. V.I. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 523 (1990) (holding that
the reasonable rate provisions of the Medicaid Act "creates a right enforceable
by health care providers under §1983"); see also Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing, 479 U.S. 418, 429 (1987) (holding that the Brooke
Amendment to the Housing Act is enforceable under § 1983).
59 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). In order to determine whether
a statutory violation may be enforced through § 1983 requires a determination of
2002
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not talking about an actual congressional intent. Realistically, the
best the courts can do (the courts never say this, but I am letting
you in on a secret), is attempt to determine what Congress would
have intended if Congress had thought about the issue. This is a
question of "hypothetical" congressional intent.
The Supreme Court decisional law in this area,
enforcement of federal statutes under Section 1983, has been very
uneven. 60 Sometimes, we talk about decisions moving in a straight
line; but this line is about as crooked as one could imagine. Not
crooked in the moral sense, but this is a line that has constantly
changed. It starts in 1980 with gangbusters when the Supreme
Court held that all federal statutes are enforceable under Section
1983 against state and local officials.6 1 Of course, if we stopped
here, there would be nothing further to discuss. But, the very next
year, the Court did a quick retreat and basically said, "wait a
second, maybe we did not mean exactly what we said., 62  The
Court held that two types of federal statutes are not enforceable
63under Section 1983. There are some federal statutes intended notto create rights but only to declare policy. 64 Additionally, there are
"whether Congress intended to create a federal right. Thus, 'the question of
whether Congress... intended to create a private right of action is defimitively
answered in the negative [where] a statute by its terms grants no private rights to
any identifiable class."' Id. (emphasis in original).
60 Id. at 278 (acknowledging that the Court's opinions on the question of
enforceability under §1983 have not been "models of clarity," employing
inconsistent language and have created "confusion" in lower courts).
61 See, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
62 See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n.,
453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (holding that when "a state official is alleged to have
violated a federal statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement
scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by
bringing suit directly under § 1983.").
63 See, e.g., Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479
U.S. _ (year) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Haldermarn, 451
U.S. 1 (1981)); Middlesex County Sewage Auth., 453 U.S. I (recognizing two
exceptions to the application of §1983 "where Congress has foreclosed such
enforcement of the statute itself and where the statute did not create enforceable
rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983.").
"See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Haldermann, 451 U.S. 1, 31
(1981) (finding that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act established a federal-state grant program whereby the government provides
federal assistance to participating states to aid them in creating programs to care
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federal statutes that are not enforceable under Section 1983
because they have such comprehensive enforcement mechanisms
built into them that Congress must have intended that those
comprehensive enforcement mechanisms would be the exclusive
mode of enforcement.
65
Since the Court's quick retreat, there have been a series of
Supreme Court decisions dealing with enforcement of federal
statutes under Section 1983 .66 Some of them are pro-plaintiff
decisions and some are pro-defendant decisions. But clearly, the
most recent decisions from the Supreme Court on this issue have
taken a "stingy" view towards the enforcement of federal statutes
under Section 1983 and have taken a quite pro-defendant
position.67
for and treat the developmentally disabled. The Act is voluntary, and the states
are given the choice of complying with the conditions set forth in the Act or
forgoing the benefits of federal funding. The Act has a systematic focus,
seeking to improve care to individuals by encouraging better state planning,
coordination and demonstration projects).
65 See supra note 61.
66 See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 348 (1997) (holding that
Social Security Act, Title IV-D, requiring participating states to establish a
separate child support enforcement unit, does not give individuals a federal right
to force a state agency to substantially comply with the statute); Wilder, 496
U.S. at 523 (holding that the Medicaid Act "creates a right enforceable by health
care providers under § 1983"); Wright, 479 U.S. at 429 (holding that the Brooke
Amendment to the Housing Act does not evidence Congress' intent to prevent
petitioner from making a § 1983 claim).
67 See, e.g., Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347 (finding that the Social Security Act,
Title IV-D, does not allow for aggrieved persons to seek redress, either judicial
or administrative. The Court noted that the "only way that Title IV-D assures
that States live up to their child support plans is through the Secretary's
oversight, even assuming the Secretary's authority to sue for specific
performance ... as the Government further contended, no private actor would
have standing to force the Secretary to bring suit for specific performance");
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that there is no
private right of action to enforce regulations that prohibit discriminatory impact
of conduct by federal funding recipients under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964); Gebster v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292-93 (1998)
(holding that the "school district [is not] liable in damages under Title IX for a




This pro-defendant position continued last term in Gonzaga
University v. Doe, 68 where the Supreme Court held that the Family
69Education Rights and Privacy Act, (FERPA), was not
enforceable under Section 1983. Specifically, the statutory
provision before the Supreme Court provided that federal funding
shall not be made available to any educational institution that has a
policy or practice of releasing student education records without
parental consent.7 1 This was a five to four decision.72 The Chief
Justice wrote the opinion for the Court, which Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined.73 That might sound a little
bit familiar because that is the federalism five, the strong
federalism faction of the Supreme Court. You might ask, why a
federalism faction on this issue of congressional intent? Well,
there is no real congressional intent, the point I made earlier. More
significantly, I think that this is a federalism issue because what is
at issue is the ability to enforce federal statutes, normally in federal
court, against state and local government. This is an aspect of
federalism.
The decision in Gonzaga University not only denied
enforcement of this particular federal statute, but had a broader
agenda as well.74 I think this is an extremely important decision
and is designed to send a message to lower federal court judges to
be very careful before they find a particular federal statutory
provision enforceable under Section 1983.
The majority in Gonzaga University held that a federal
statute is not enforceable under Section 1983 unless the statute
creates a right in unmistakably clear language.75 The dissenters
found that language in the majority opinion sounds like a
presumption against allowing enforcement of federal statutes under
Section 1983.76 There is also language in the majority opinion that
the Court has rarely held spending clause legislation enforceable
68 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
69 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (g) (b) (1) (2000).
70 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 278.
71 Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (g)(b)(1).
72 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 273.
73 id.
74 Id. at 290.
75 id.
76 Id. at 298 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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under Section 1983. 77 So, this is a very important decision. It
gives a lot of ammunition to attorneys that represent state and local
government and I think it is going to be big trouble for plaintiffs'
lawyers.
BIVENS CLAIMS AGAINST FEDERAL OFFICIALS
When a plaintiff seeks to assert a constitutional claim, not
against a state or local official, but against a federal official, the
plaintiff cannot utilize Section 1983 because the federal official did
not act under color of state law.7 8 As it turns out, there is no
federal statute that is the counterpart of Section 1983 for claims
against federal officials. So, what the plaintiff would have to do is
rely on the Bivens doctrine, named after the Supreme Court's 1971
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics79 . If the agents were unknown, how
is it they were named, and if they were named, how is it that they
were unknown? I think this is really a way of saying that the
plaintiff intended to make a claim against a known defendant but
could not identify him.
In the landmark Bivens decision, the Supreme Court
recognized a claim for damages directly under the Fourth
Amendment against federal law enforcement officers. 80  Then, the
Court recognized a Bivens claim in the next two cases that came
before the Court. First, in Davis v. Passman,8' the Court
recognized a claim for damages under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 82  It was actually an equal protection claim
77 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.
78 Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (finding "the injury
[must] be 'under color of state law.' As such, 'any person' acting 'under color of
state law' may be held liable for affirmative conduct that 'subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any person ... to the deprivation of any 'federal constitutional or
statutory right."').
79 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Bivens doctrine allows suits to be brought against
federal prosecutors for violating constitutional rights and recognizes a cause of
action for money damages directly under the Constitution. Id. at 397.
80 Id. at 389-90. The plaintiff alleged that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, without probable cause, made a warrantless search of his apartment
and arrested him for possession of narcotics. Id.
81 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
82 Id. at 248-49; U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part:
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based upon the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Next,
in 1980, the Supreme Court decided Carlson v. Green,83 where the
Court again recognized a Bivens claim for damages directly under
the Eighth Amendment. 84 These decisions enabled individuals to
enforce their constitutional rights against federal officials.
The Court in Bivens and Davis expressed concern that for
some plaintiffs; it is a damage remedy against a federal official or
no remedy. It is damages or nothing because these plaintiffs often
do not have standing to seek prospective relief.85 Moreover, they
cannot sue the federal government because the federal government
has sovereign immunity protection.8 6 So, this claim for damages
against a federal official in his personal capacity is the only claim
left. The Court in these early Bivens decisions regarded the claim
for damages as an ordinary remedy for a deprivation of an interest
in personal liberty.8 7 And, the Court thought that the Supreme
Court was a highly appropriate body to formulate remedies for
constitutional violations.
88
However, in every Supreme Court case since 1983 to the
present in which a Bivens claim was raised, the Supreme Court has
found one reason or another to reject the right to assert the Bivens
claim. In some cases, the Court rejected the Bivens claim because
there was something special about the subject matter of the Bivens
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury ... nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law....
3 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
84 Id. at 22; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. provides in pertinent part: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
85 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1983) (holding that
plaintiff lacked standing to seek injunctive relief for unconstitutional actions of
the Los Angeles police department because the plaintiff could not show a
"substantial likelihood" of being injured again in the same way).
86 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410.
87 Id. at 395.
88 Id. at 396.
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claim, as in cases relating to military operations.8 9 In some of the
cases, the Bivens claim was rejected because the Court found that
Congress had created an alternative remedy, even if the alternative
remedy was' not as effective as the Bivens remedy. 90 The Supreme
Court rejected the Bivens remedy in one case because the plaintiff
sought to assert the claim against the federal agency rather than
against the federal official.91 There is a clear trend, since the year
1983, in which the United States Supreme Court has rejected
plaintiff's attempts, one after another, to asserting Bivens' claims.
This trend continued last term in Correctional Services
Corporation v. Malesko.92  The Supreme Court held that an
individual cannot assert a constitutional claim under the Bivens
doctrine against a private entity alleged to have been involved in
the government action.93 The entity, the Corrections Corporation,
was operating a halfway house for the federal government. 94 This
case gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to decide whether a
private prison is engaged in governmental action. The Court
sidestepped that issue, indeed, did not even mention it. Instead, the
Court based its holding on its determination that Bivens claims,
when they are available, may not be asserted against entities,
whether the entity is a federal agency or, as in this case, is a private
entity alleged to be engaged in government action.95 The Court
reasoned that the dominant purpose of the Bivens remedy is to
89 See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (holding that
Congress did not provide a damages remedy for claims by military personnel
asserting constitutional violations by their superiors and any judicial response
would be inconsistent with Congress's authority in this field).
90 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425-27 (1988) (holding a
Bivens remedy unavailable for money damages' against federal officers who
administered a program for social security disability benefits as a matter of law
because Congress had provided adequate remedial mechanisms for the alleged
constitutional violation); Lucas, 462 U.S. at 377 (declining to create a Bivens
remedy against individual government officials for First Amendment violations
reasoning Congress was in a better position to do so).
91 See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 472 (1994) (holding that the logic
of Bivens does not support a cause of action directly against an agency of the
federal government).
92 534 U.S. 61 (2001).93 Id. at 72.




deter constitutional violations by federal officials, not to grant
relief against entities.96 Well, that seems somewhat disingenuous
because for the past quarter century, the Court has not been overly
concerned about recognizing the Bivens remedy against federal
officials either. 97 Then, what I think is the understatement of the
term, for me at least, is when the Court said, "in the last thirty
years we have been cautious about extending Bivens into new
areas." 98 "Cautious"? For the past thirty years, not one decision
by the Supreme Court has recognized the availability of the Bivens
remedy!
The Supreme Court in the early Bivens cases took the
position that the formulation of remedies for constitutional
violations is primarily the function, and a highly appropriate
function, for the United States Supreme Court. 99  The Supreme
Court's more recent Bivens decisions view this issue of remedies
as primarily an issue for Congress. 00 So, there is a separation of
powers aspect to the Bivens decision. I think we have come full
circle, or almost full circle, from an initial philosophy that the
Bivens remedy was a presumptively available remedy for
constitutional violations to where we are today, the Bivens remedy
as a presumptively unavailable remedy.
96 d. at 69.
97 See, e.g., Lucas, 462 U.S. at 367 (declining to create a Bivens remedy
against individual government officials for First Amendment violations
reasoning Congress was in a better position to do so).98 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68.
99 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-96.
'0o Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68.
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